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Laws and other formal rules are ‘obligations backed by incentives’. In this paper we explore how formal
rules affect cooperative behavior. Our analysis is based on a series of experimental public good games
designed to isolate the impact of exogenously requestedminimumcontributions (obligations) from those
of the marginal incentives backing them. We ﬁnd that obligations have a sizeable effect on cooperative
behavior even in the absence of incentives. When non-binding incentives are introduced, requested con-
tributions strongly sustain cooperation. Therefore, in contrast with cases in which incentives crowd-out
cooperative behavior, in our experiments obligations and incentives are complementary, jointly sup-ormal rules
uman behavior
ncentives
aws
bligations
porting high levels of contributions. Moreover, we ﬁnd that variations in obligations affect behavior even
when incentives are held constant. Finally, we explore the behavioral channels of the previous results,
ﬁnding that people’s beliefs about others’ contributions and the willingness to cooperate are both called
into play.references
ublic good game
. Introduction
Formal rules and public policies play a fundamental role in reg-
lating people’s daily interactions. Traditionally, economists have
tudied the design of optimal rules and laws by focusing on their
nforcement and on designing optimal incentives. By focusing
lmost exclusively on the role of incentives, economics literature
eglected a crucial aspect that is usually taken into account by
egal scholars interested in developing good laws: laws and formal
ules are “obligations backed by incentives”.1 The obligation part of
formal rule consists in the behavior the rule states people should
aintain, and the incentives part relates to the consequences for
aintaining or violating the requested behavior.2 Legal theorists
nd social psychologists3 suggest that laws are effective in regulat-
ng people’s behavior not only through the enforcement structure,
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: galbiatir@gmail.com (R. Galbiati).
1 See Raz (1980).
2 Typically, a formal rule is a statement such as: “you ought to. . . and then you
ill get. . .” (or “you ought to. . . or else you will pay. . .”). In this sentence, incentives
re captured by the “and you will get/or else you will pay . . .” part, and obligations
y the “you ought to. . .” component.
3 See Tyler (1990).but also in what they ask of people, or signal.4 Under this per-
spective, the normative content of the rule can activate people’s
motivation and can induce compliance as the material incentive
enforcing the rule itself. Moreover, by stating formally how peo-
ple should behave, formal rules provide a focal point that helps
people coordinate. If we think to compliance with law as a public
good, this effect is likely to be crucial in the presence of conditional
co-operators (Fischbacher and Gaechter, 2010), because in such a
situation a public good game is equivalent to a coordination game
(Camerer and Fehr, 2002). Understanding the interaction between
incentives and obligations (the content of the norm) is thus cru-
cial for developing public policies. In this work we experimentally
study how obligations work and how they interact with incentives
in affecting human behavior. In particularwe explore the following
questions:(i) How do obligations per se affect cooperative behavior?
(ii) How do non-binding incentives per se affect cooperative
behavior?
4 See Kahan (1997), Cooter (2000) and McAdams (2000), Croson (2009). In eco-
nomics, the theoretical work by Bar-Gill and Fershtman (2004) and Bowles and
Polania-Reyes (2012) explore the possibility that laws affect behavior by driving
the evolution of preferences. Van der Weele (2012) explores and develops a model
of the signaling power of legal rules.
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2iii) How do obligations and non-binding incentives interact with
each other?
iv) What are the channels through which obligations and non-
binding incentives affect behavior?
Our analysis is based on a series of linear public goods
xperiments5 in which we independently vary the intensity of
ncentives and the level of obligations. Obligations are introduced
n the form of a minimum contribution: “a minimum contribution
f X tokens to the public good is required from each individ-
al”. Incentives are implemented as probabilistic punishments
or contributions below the minimum and probabilistic rewards
or contributions above the minimum. The incentive schemes are
tructured in such a way that not contributing to the public good
emains the dominant strategy for payoff-maximizers. Thus, our
ncentive structure is non-binding and marginal payoffs are inde-
endent of the minimum contribution. Hence, if we observe any
ifference in results across treatments with different minimum
ontributions, this cannot be attributed to the effect of incentives
n payoffs, but its justiﬁcation should be sought elsewhere.
The overall picture emerging from our experimental results is
s follows. The introduction of an obligation in the absence of
ncentives leads to an increase in the provision of the public good.
his means that the introduction of a rule, even if not enforced,
ositively affects people’s propensity to cooperate. Instead, the
ntroduction of non-binding incentives without an obligation does
ot signiﬁcantly affect contributions. When obligations and incen-
ives are combined, cooperation is strongly reinforced: the joint
ffect of incentives and obligations on contributions is signiﬁcantly
ore positive than the impact of obligations alone. Thismeans that
bligations and incentives are complementary, jointly supporting
igh levels of contribution. This last aspect is particularly relevant:
his means that, when combined with an obligation, incentives
rowd-in reasons for behavior other than a material self-interest
n sustaining cooperation.6
In order to provide a behavioral interpretation of these results,
e analyze the possible channels driving cooperation. We ﬁnd
hat obligations affect behavior through two channels: (i) given
eliefs about the behavior of others increase people’s willingness
o contribute, and (ii) they increase people’s beliefs concerning
he contributions of others. Since most participants are conditional
o-operators, both these effects raise the contribution to the pub-
ic good. Non-binding incentives per se do not affect individuals’
eliefs and preferences. Instead, when combined with obligations,
hey strongly reinforce the impact of obligations through both
hannels.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review
f the related literature. Section 3 reports the experimental design
nd behavioral predictions. Section 4 describes and comments on
he results. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
5 The choice to carry out our experimental investigation in a public good setting is
otivated by the fact that formal rules, and in particular legal rules, are often set by
egislators and governments with the speciﬁc objective of overcoming social dilem-
as (e.g. free riding in income tax compliance, commonpool resourcemanagement,
rafﬁc behavior, or environmental regulation) by aligning private incentives to the
ommon good.
6 From this point of view, this study contributes to a burgeoning literature in
ehavioral economics aiming to provide us with a greater understanding of the psy-
hological effects of incentives (see among others Benabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006;
ohnet et al., 2001; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Falk et al., 2005, 2006; Fehr and Falk,
002; Fehr andSchmidt, 2002; Fehr and List, 2004; Frey and Jegen, 2001;Gneezy and
ustichini, 2000a,b; Kube and Traxler, 2009; Van Der Weele, 2012; Galbiati et al.,
013).2. Literature review
Our study relates to several strands of the literature. First, there
is extensive literature developed in the last decade on the effects
of institutions in the provision of public goods. In particular, our
study relates to the literature focusing on exogenously imposed
institutions. Falkinger et al. (2000) examine a mechanism for pub-
lic good provision in which rewards and sanctions are imposed to
players who contribute to the public good more and less than the
average. The authors demonstrate experimentally that the mecha-
nism is an effective tool to implement efﬁcient contribution levels.
Andreoni (1993) presents an experimental test of the proposition
that government contributions to public goods, funded by lump-
sum taxation, will completely crowd-out voluntary contributions.
The author ﬁnds that crowding-out is incomplete and that subjects
who are taxed are signiﬁcantly more cooperative.
Another strand of literature focuses on the crowding-
out/crowding-in effects of incentives. Fehr and Falk (2002), Frey
and Jegen (2001) and Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) provide
excellent surveys of the topic. Our paper complements this liter-
ature by showing the crowding-in effect of incentives to the public
good, when these are coupled with obligations. Our results show
that incentives and obligations are complementary, and mutually
sustain theeffectof theother inenhancingcooperation,whilewhen
“mild” incentives are used alone they are ineffective. Another con-
tribution of our paper is to further the research on analyzing the
channels of this effect. Most papers in this ﬁeld are not able to
single out the channels of the treatment effects (i.e. the effects
of introducing incentives or changing institutions). For example,
a much cited paper (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b) showed that
a ﬁne for picking up children late from a day-care center actu-
ally increased late-coming but could not document the channel
thorough which ﬁnes induced more late coming. By eliciting par-
ticipants’ beliefs and conditional contributions, our experimental
design can show how obligations and incentives affect the behav-
ioral motivations of behavior experimental subjects.
Ourwork also relates to the literature in legal scholarship on the
Focal Point Theory of (Expressive) Law (McAdams, 2000;McAdams
and Nadler, 2005). According to this theory, laws can be used to
coordinate expectations on a beneﬁcial equilibrium. In an exper-
iment by Bohnet and Cooter (2005), penalties for choosing the
inefﬁcient strategy in a coordination game induce more people to
choose the efﬁcient strategy. Our experimental results go in a simi-
lar direction by showing that the basic components of formal rules
(obligations and incentives) complement each other by inducing
conditional cooperators to increase their contributions to the pub-
lic good. A further strand of legal literature that relates to our paper
is that on “expressive law” (e.g. Kahan, 1997; Cooter, 2000). The
idea herein is that laws express the reigning norms in a society,
and can discipline people by showing them what the majority of
people deem (to be) ‘appropriate’. Funk (2007) reports ﬁeld results
in line with this intuition. Using a Swiss panel data, she ﬁnds that
the legal abolishment of the voting duty signiﬁcantly decreased
the average turnout, even though the ﬁnes for not voting have only
been minimal. Our results on obligations sustain this intuition and
our analysis of conditional contribution schedules shows that the
willingness to contribute to the public good can be “anchored” to
the level of obligations.
In a recent paper related to ours, Tyran and Feld (2006) run an
experiment that compares the effects of endogenously and exoge-
nously introduced ‘mild’ or ‘non-deterrent’ sanctions in a public
good game. In the endogenous treatment, the subjects vote on
whether to introduce the sanction. The authors show that endoge-
nous sanctions are more effective in raising contributions than
exogenously implemented sanctions. The interpretation of this
result is that endogenous sanctions signal that there are many
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eeople who want to cooperate. Our results on incentives com-
lement this result by showing that a variation in exogenously
mposed mild sanctions does not affect contributions to the pub-
ic good when incentives are not coupled with obligations. On
he other hand, exogenous mild incentives complement the pos-
tive effect of obligations on cooperation when they are used
ogether.
Finally this paper relates to a previous work by Galbiati and
ertova (2008) that documents the positive effect of obligations
n cooperation in a dynamic voluntary contribution mechanism.
n this paper we report and discuss the evidence from new experi-
ental treatments designed to understand: (a) the separate effect
f obligations and incentives on cooperation; (b) the combined
ffect of obligations and incentives; and (c) the behavioral channels
riving these effects.
. Experiment
.1. The experimental game
The basic experiment consists of a one-shot linear public good
ame, followed by a conditional contribution stage. Overall, we ask
articipants to make two choices. The ﬁrst is a choice of ‘uncondi-
ional contribution’: subjects are asked to make their contributions
o the public good. After all subjects have chosen their uncon-
itional contribution, we ask participants to make their choices
f ‘conditional contribution’, that is to say, to select how much
o contribute to the public good in relation to different aver-
ge contributions by the other group members. Finally, we elicit
ndividual beliefs about the others’ unconditional contributions.
ndividuals will ﬁnd out what the others have decided and their
wn payoff only after all three of these stages have been com-
leted.
The linear public good game we implement differs from a
tandard voluntary contribution mechanism in that we exoge-
ously set a minimum level of contribution that each subject is
equired to provide to the public good. The game has two main
ariants. The ﬁrst without incentives at all: we simply introduce
he requested minimum contribution without any form of mon-
toring of individuals’ actual behavior. In the second variant, the
inimum contribution is backed by a structure of incentives: there
s a probability of being monitored and a probabilistic penalty
reward) for individuals whose contributions are lower (higher)
han the minimum level of contribution required.7 We are inter-
sted in understanding whether the minimum contribution has
different effect in the presence or in the absence of incentives,
nd in the second case we want to isolate its effects from those of
he marginal incentives. Therefore, we keep the level of marginal
ncentives ﬁxed across all treatments, i.e. the probability of being
udited and the penalty/reward rate do not vary with the min-
mum contribution obligation. On the contrary, the level of the
equired minimum contribution changes across the treatments.
he incentives are ﬁxed at a very low level. There are two rea-
ons behind this choice: ﬁrstly, we aim to test whether or not the
bligation of a minimum contribution affects cooperation when
ncentives are such that the optimal strategy for self-interested
ndividuals is full free-riding, even if they are risk-averse to a
easonable degree. Secondly, we want to minimize the possible
ias in our results caused by differences in risk preferences across
amples.8
7 The penalty (reward) is proportional to the negative (positive) difference
etween the actual contribution and the minimum contribution required.
8 Nevertheless we check the robustness of our results by controlling for differ-
nces in risk preferences (see Appendix 1).In the one-shot public good game (unconditional contribution
stage), the expected monetary payoff for individual i is:
Xi = y − ai + m
n∑
j=1
aj − pg(aˆ − ai) (1)
where y is the individual endowment, ai is the individual contribu-
tion to thepublic good,m indicates themarginal per capita return to
the public good A ≡∑nj=1aj , p is the probability of an audit, and g is
the penalty/reward rate. We set the parameters so that the follow-
ing inequalities hold: m>1/n and m+pg<1. In the variant without
incentives we ﬁx pg=0.
Inorder tounderstandwhether apossible effect of theminimum
contribution on cooperation should be attributed to an inﬂuence
on preferences, on beliefs, or on both, and if such motivational
channels are affected by the presence or absence of incentives, we
need to understand: (a) if individuals’ beliefs about others’ contrib-
utions are signiﬁcantly different in the different treatments; (b)
if, given the others’ hypothetical contributions, individuals’ con-
ditional behavior signiﬁcantly varies in the different treatments.
In order to pursue the latter aim, in all the treatments we elicit
the subjects’ “conditional contributions” by applying a variant of
the so-called “strategy method” (Selten, 1967), as developed in
the experimental design by Fischbacher et al. (2001). After the
unconditional contribution stage, subjects are asked to report their
conditional contributions. In particular, each subject has to ﬁll in
a conditional contribution table: for each possible level of aver-
age contribution in the group, and given the level of minimum
obligation, the individual has to declare how much they want to
contribute to the public good. To give subjects a material incentive
to take their conditional contributiondecisions seriously,we follow
the procedure designed by Fischbacher et al. (2001). Subjects are
told that, after they have taken both decisions, a random mecha-
nism will select which of the two decisions becomes effective in
determining their payoffs. In each group, one subject is randomly
selected. For this subject the conditional contribution table deter-
mines their actual contribution to the public good, whereas for the
other group members the relevant decision is the unconditional
contribution. This mechanism ensures that all entries in the con-
ditional contribution table are potentially relevant in determining
the payoffs of each subject.
After all the players have decided how much to contribute to
the public good, the monitoring stage takes place: a player’s con-
tribution may be randomly monitored (with probability p) and the
player may get a monetary reward (sanction) if they have con-
tributed more (less) than the minimum contribution required by
the obligation. Finally, in order to have a proxy of what people
believe the others’ contributions to be, in each treatment we ask
each subject what they expect the others in their group have con-
tributed on average to the unconditional contribution decision. In
order to give an incentive to take this decision seriously, those
whoactuallymake the right predictiongain anadditionalmonetary
payment.
3.2. Treatments, parameters and procedures
In order to investigate our research questions, we implement
six different experimental treatments: two treatments without
incentives, three treatments with the same incentive structure and
ﬁnally a treatment with a very low level of incentives. Table 1 sum-
marizes the experimental treatments.
ThePG treatment is abaselinepublic goodgamewithout amate-
rial incentive to contribute. In treatment H(no-i) we introduce a
requiredminimumcontributionequal to80%ofan individual’s total
endowment. This second treatment simplyworks as a baseline vol-
untary contributionmechanismwith a suggested contribution that
Table 1
Experimental treatments.
Obligation (required minimum contribution)
No (0) Low (4) High (16)
Incentives (detection probability)
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margin the requested minimum contribution cannot affect mon-
etary incentives. Nevertheless, if individual reasons for behavior
depart from the traditional assumption of self-interest,12 someNo (0) PG H(no-i)
Low (1/100) H(low-i)
High (1/12) 0 L H
e can consider as third-party cheap talk. The treatments with a
onitoring structure are the following. We have three treatments
ith a probability of monitoring p=1/12: a 0 treatment, where no
inimum contribution is required and subjects obtain a reward
f they are monitored and their contributions to the public good
re higher than zero; a low minimum contribution treatment (L),
here subjects are required to contribute at least 20% of their ini-
ial endowment; and a high minimum contribution treatment (H),
here the minimum contribution required corresponds to 80% of
n individual’s total endowment. In both these last treatments indi-
iduals’ contributions can be monitored. If they contribute less
more) than the required contribution, they get a penalty (reward).
s we are interested in the effects of obligations per se, we keep the
evel ofmarginal incentives (i.e. theprobabilityof beingauditedand
he penalty/reward rate) ﬁxed across all treatments.
In the instructions we stress that the obligation sets a minimum
ontribution required from each individual, but that the feasible
ontribution for each participant varies between 0 and their over-
ll endowment. We also explain in detail the consequences of each
hoice on individual payoffs. In the last treatment (H(low-i)) the
evel of minimum contribution is ﬁxed at a level closer to zero
detection probability p=1/100) to allow us to further investigate
he role of incentives and to be sure that the effects we ﬁnd depend
n their presence and not on their level. A comparison between the
wo high obligation conditions with different incentive levels and
he baseline condition without obligations provides us with infor-
ation about the effect of varying marginal incentives on levels of
ooperation.
The parameters of the game are set as follows. The initial
ndowment is y=20, the number of subjects per group is n=6,
he marginal per capita return to the public good is m=0.3, the
robability of being monitored is p=1/29 (but p=1/100 in the
(low-i)), the sanction/reward rate is equal to g=1.2 (this ensures
hat: m>1/n and m+pg<1), the minimum contributions ﬁxed by
he obligation are aˆ = 4 in treatment L, and aˆ = 16 in treatment H,
espectively.
The experiment was conducted in a computerized laboratory
here subjects interacted with each other anonymously.10 No
ubject was ever informed about the identity of the other group
embers. We did not provide information about other individuals’
ontributions in the same group. At the end of the game subjects
ere only provided with information about their own payoff. This
hould rule out emotional elements related to stigma and shame
n the explanation of the results. We conducted six sessions, one
or each treatment. In each session participants were divided into
groups of 6, with the exception of H (no-i), which has 5 groups of
, for a total of 210 subjects. Subjects were undergraduate students
rom different faculties. Each subject participated in one session
nly and nobody had previously participated in other public good
9 This probability results from the following procedure: given a groupof 6 players,
rst the group is selected with a probability of 1/2, and then, in the positive case?,
ne of the six individuals in the group is selected. Notice that the anonymity of the
udit is guaranteed.
10 To conduct the experiment we used the experimental software ‘z-Tree’ devel-
ped by Fischbacher (2007).experiments. The experiment was conducted in the experimental
laboratory of the University of Siena (Italy), in different sessions
from December 2005 to April 2008. Each session lasted about one
hour, and the average earnings for each subject were 14 Euros
(about 20 US dollars).
3.3. Predictions and testing
Hereafter we report the kind of comparisons that we made in
order to answer each of the questions reported in the introduction,
together with some predictions of expected behavior.
3.3.1. How do obligations per se affect cooperative behavior?
In order to answer these questions we compare: (a) uncondi-
tional contributions in the H(no-i) treatment to contributions in
the PG treatment and (b) unconditional contributions in the H, L
and 0 treatments respectively.
If we assume common knowledge of rationality, risk neutrality
and selﬁshness of all players, we expect that in every treatment the
unconditional contributionof each subjectwill be equal to zero, and
that conditional contribution entries will all be zero for each sub-
ject. For example, let us consider in our setting the optimal choice
by a risk-neutral and fully self-interested individual. Their optimal
contribution, a∗
i
, is the value of ai which maximizes (1). The ﬁrst
order condition of the maximization problem yields:
∂Xi
∂ai
= −1 + m + pg < 0 (2)
Hence, the dominant strategy for a (risk-neutral) self-interested
individual is always full free riding: a∗
i
= 0. This result depends
crucially on the assumption that m+pg<1, meaning that the mon-
etary incentives are not sufﬁciently high to make the expected
return from one unit of contribution higher than the unit kept for
oneself. Notice that the level of minimum contribution obligation
aˆ does not affect the optimal choice of a self-interested individ-
ual. This is straightforward since minimum contributions do not
affect marginal monetary payoffs. In order to satisfy this condi-
tion, our setting presents both a probabilistic penalty for those
who contribute less than the minimum contribution and a prob-
abilistic reward for those who contribute more. Notice that if we
had instead applied only a probabilistic penalty (or only a proba-
bilistic reward) for individuals who contribute less (more) than aˆ,
we would have obtained two distinct ﬁrst-order conditions for the
maximization problem, one for the interval ai ≤ aˆ and the other for
the interval ai > aˆ. However, in this case different levels of aˆ would
have implied different marginal monetary payoffs, which instead
we want to keep ﬁxed in order to isolate the effect of different
minimum contributions.11
If individuals were all merely self-interested, minimum recom-
mended contributions would not have any effect for two reasons:
ﬁrst, because the optimal contribution for a self-interested indi-
vidual is always the null contribution; second, because at the11 It is worth noting that there are cases in the real world in which penalties are
applied to those breaking the law and rewards are given to those who abide by
the law. For instance, in Italy, penalties (in the form of a reduction in points on the
driving license) are implemented for those who violate the Highway Code, while
rewards (in the form of more points added to the driving license) are given to those
whodo not violate the Highway Code for two consecutive years. This case is very
similar to ours, since road safety could easily be thought of as/considered a public
good.
12 A huge amount of empirical and experimental literature shows that in
social dilemmas many individuals are driven by social preferences, i.e. having
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proportion of individuals on the vertical one).
To investigate how the introduction of a minimum recom-
mended contribution affects donating to the public good in the
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
PG
0
L
H(no-i)
H(low-i)ndividuals may make positive contributions (as usually observed
n experimental public good games), and minimum recommended
ontributions might have some effect on individual behavior. Since
he structure of our game excludes any possible effect of minimum
ontribution rules on marginal incentives, any effect needs to be
xplained on the basis of their behavioral effects.
.3.2. How do non-binding incentives per se affect cooperative
ehavior?
In order to answer this question we compare: (a) unconditional
ontributions in treatment 0 to those in treatment PG; (b) uncon-
itional contributions in H(no-i) to those in H(low-i) and H; and (c)
nconditional contributions in H to those in H(low-i). These com-
arisons allow us to evaluate: (a) the impact of the introduction
f incentives to contributions to the public good in the absence
f obligations; (b) the impact of the introduction of incentives to
ontributions to the public good in the presence of a recommended
inimumcontribution; and (c) the impact of a variation in the level
f incentives in the presence of a recommended minimum contri-
ution. As incentives are set at a non-binding level, we expect that
arying them will not affect cooperation.
.3.3. How do obligations and non-binding incentives interact
ith each other?
To answer this question, we compare contributions in the PG
reatment to contributions in the H(no-i), H(low-i) and H respec-
ively. The results of these comparisons help to shed light on
he relation between incentives and obligations; in particular, we
nvestigate the role of thepresence/absence of incentives inmaking
bligations effective. The question to ask is whether the fact that a
ontribution is required is enough to exert a behavioral effect, or
hether it is necessary to have an incentive structure (though non-
inding) for the requirement to have a signiﬁcant effect. If the latter
s the case, we may conclude that incentives not only shape payoffs
ut they also complement obligations; in particular, non-binding
ncentives, far from being redundant, play a crucial role in making
ormal rules work.
.3.4. What are the channels through which obligations and
on-binding incentives affect behavior?
Finally, in order to provide a behavioral interpretation of the
ossible effect of obligations (incentives) on cooperation, we
ompare the average beliefs about others’ contributions and the
onditional contributions in different treatments. We can put forth
ome conjectures. First, if some individuals are conditional co-
perators (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gaechter,
010), i.e. they are willing to cooperate (despite monetary incen-
ives to free-ride) if the other members of their group cooperate to
sufﬁcient extent, minimum contributions may coordinate indi-
iduals’ beliefs to common focal points, thus affecting cooperative
ehavior. Second,minimum contributions, being perceived as obli-
ations, may have direct psychological effects on preferences (and
hus on behavior) if they affect individual personal contribution
orms. If obligations affect beliefs, we expect to observe signiﬁ-
ant differences in beliefs stated about others’ contributions across
reatments. If they affect preferences, we expect to ﬁnd signiﬁcant
ifferences in the conditional contribution schedules. In particular,
f people make different contributions for the same hypotheti-
al average contributions of other group members, it means that
references for cooperation are directly shaped by the minimum
ontribution rules.
ther-regardingor process-regardingpreferences (for a surveyon social preferences
ee Camerer and Fehr, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 2002).PG 0 L H(no-i) H(low-i) H
Fig. 1. Unconditional contributions (average contribution in each treatment).
4. Results
4.1. Question 1: How do obligations per se affect cooperative
behavior?
In order to answer this question we compare: (a) unconditional
contributions in the H(no-i) treatment to contributions in the PG
treatment and (b) unconditional contributions in the H, L and 0
treatments respectively.
The ﬁrst step of our analysis aims to clarify whether variations
in the requested minimum contribution signiﬁcantly affect coop-
erative behavior. In this respect, we have two possibilities. First,
an obligation is introduced in the absence of incentives. Second, an
obligation is introduced and varied in the presence of incentives.
This analysis provides us with information about whether obliga-
tions per se have any effect on behavior and how obligations and
non-binding incentives interact. In particular, we try to understand
whether the response to a recommended minimum contribution
to the public good in the case that there is no incentive structure,
differs from the response in the case that there is a non-binding
enforcement structure.
In Fig. 1we report the average unconditional contributions in all
the six treatments. Thus, we have an overall picture of the effects of
variations in obligations andnon-binding incentives on the average
cooperative behavior across treatments. In order to better inter-
pret the results on average contributions, we also construct Fig. 2,
which represents the cumulative average contributions in all treat-
ments (with average contributions on the horizontal axis and the0
0.1
0.2
0.3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
H
Fig. 2. Unconditional contributions (cumulative average contributions).
Table 2
Test statistics.
Difference
between
unconditional
contributions
Z statistics T statistics
H condition Vs PG 7.027 4.888 5.671
PG vs zero condition 0.277 0.175 0.197
H condition Vs L condition 5.694 4.634 5.257
L condition vs PG 1.333 0.836 1.117
H no incentives vs PG 3.305 2.221 2.205
H condition vs H no incentive 3.772 2.459 2.667
H low inc vs H no inc −3.444 −2.205 −2.290
H condition vs H low inc −.2777 −0.023 −0.223
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ifferences signiﬁcant at 5% are reported in italics.
bsence of a non-binding incentive structure, we initially focus
n the PG and on the H(no-i) treatments. The ﬁrst treatment is
he baseline treatment: a one-shot linear public good game with-
ut a requested minimum contribution or incentives, coupled with
he elicitation of conditional contributions and beliefs. The sec-
nd treatment introduces a high requested minimum contribution
16 tokens), without a penalty or reward structure. From Fig. 1
e observe that in the PG treatment we replicate the ﬁndings in
ublic good experiments that average contributions are positive
ut far from efﬁcient. In the treatment with a requested mini-
um contribution, the average unconditional contribution to the
ublic good increases by 41% with respect to the baseline PG treat-
ent (from 8.02 in PG to 11.33 in H(no-i)). Thus, the introduction
f a minimum requested contribution per se increases efﬁciency.
able 2 reports results for mean comparisons between pairs of
reatments. As results reported in the table show, to test the sta-
istical signiﬁcance of the differences in the contributions between
wo treatments, we run both a Mann–Whitney rank-sum test and
standard t-test.13 Results comparing PG and H(no-i) treatments
how that the difference in the average contributions in the two
reatments is signiﬁcant at conventional levels. This shows that
uggested obligations affect average contributions to the public
ood.
To better understand how obligations affect unconditional con-
ributions,wenowanalyze theeffectofdifferent levelsofobligation
or a given structure of incentives. Looking at the treatment where
he obligation is 4 tokens (L) and at the treatment where no min-
mum contribution is required (0) in Fig. 1, we observe similar
evels of average contribution to the public good (9.36 and 8.30
okens respectively). On the other hand, the average contribution
n the treatmentwhere theobligation is 16 tokens (H) is remarkably
igher (15.1 tokens) than in the other two treatments. By running
Mann–Whitney rank-sum test and a t-test to verify the statistical
igniﬁcance of the differences in contribution levels between the
reatments, we ﬁnd that mean contributions in treatment H are
igher at signiﬁcant statistical levels than mean contributions in
oth the other treatments, while we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant dif-
erence between the average contributions in the 0 and in the L
reatment.
This secondresult is in linewith theﬁndingsobtainedbyGalbiati
nd Vertova (2008)14 in a repeated public good game: for given
arginal incentives, obligations can affect the average propensity
o cooperate for the public good. In particular, when the mini-
um contribution required is sufﬁciently high (treatment H), the
13 The unit of observation in the statistical tests is individuals.
14 Galbiati andVertova (2008) focus on the effect of obligations in a repeatedpublic
ood game. Unlike this paper, they do not analyze the determinants of the effects
f obligations but rather their dynamic effects on cooperation.level of cooperation is signiﬁcantly higher than in the presence
of low or null obligations. Instead, when the minimum contri-
bution required by the obligation is low (treatment L), there is
no signiﬁcant difference with respect to the no-obligation case. A
straightforward interpretation of this last result is that with a low
obligation, conditional co-operators ﬁnd conﬁrmation (on average)
of their preferences and beliefs when no obligation exists.15
This evidence can be summarized as follows:
Result 1. The introduction of a minimum recommended contri-
bution (in the absence of incentives) leads to an increase in the
provisionof thepublic good. In thepresenceof anon-binding incen-
tive structure, average contributions are signiﬁcantly higher when
theminimumcontribution required by the obligation is sufﬁciently
higher than the average contributions in the ‘no obligation’ case.
These results tell us that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the
minimum contribution requested positively affects cooperative
behavior. Moreover, by observing differences between coopera-
tion levels in the presence and absence of incentives, it emerges
that the presence of an incentive structure seems to reinforce the
effect of obligations. The next step in our analysis focuses on the
effect of ceteris paribus variations in incentives. Afterwards, we
will come back to this last observation to analyze how incentives
and obligations interact.
4.2. Question 2: Ceteris paribus, how do non-binding incentives
affect cooperative behavior?
In order to answer this question we compare: (a) uncondi-
tional contributions in treatment 0 to those in treatment PG; (b)
unconditional contributions in H(no-i) to those in H(low-i); and (c)
unconditional contributions in H to those in H(low-i). These com-
parisons allow us to evaluate: (a) the impact of the introduction
of incentives on contributions to the public good in the absence
of obligations; (b) the impact of the introduction of incentives on
contributions to the public good in the presence of a recommended
minimum contribution; (c) the impact of a variation in the level
of incentives in the presence of a recommended minimum con-
tribution. It is worth mentioning that we are not interested in an
investigation into the effects of binding incentives: a binding incen-
tives scheme would in fact change the game’s payoff structure, and
make ‘full contribution’ a dominant strategy for all players.
We start by analyzing the effect of the introduction of non-
binding incentives in the absence of obligations. By comparing the
unconditional contributions in the 0 and PG treatments, we can
better observe how incentives work. These two treatments are
characterized by the absence of a recommended minimum contri-
bution and differ because in the 0 treatmentwehave a probabilistic
reward system, while in the PG treatment there is no incentive
to contribute to the public good. We do not observe any signiﬁ-
cant difference between the unconditional contributions in the two
treatments (see Fig. 1). In the absence of obligations, the introduc-
tion of weak incentives does not have any effect on cooperative
behavior. A comparison between the ‘PG condition’ and ‘0 condi-
tion’ provides us with further insight into the behavioral effect of
incentives. Note that the game played in the ‘0 condition’ is a basic
linear public goodgamewith anon-binding incentive to contribute.
In our case, we observe neither the crowding-in nor the crowding-
outof contributions in theabsenceofobligations.Aplausible reason
for this result is that, in this case, the incentives are exogenously
ﬁxed by a third party with respect to the behavior of others, and
15 Indeed inone-shotpublicgoodgameswithnoobligations, averagecontributions
tend to be around 40–50% of the overall endowment because of the behavior of
conditional co-operators. See, among others, Fischbacher et al. (2001).
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16ence they do not provide any information about other peoples’
otivations. This suggests that incentives activate or crowd-out
ocial preferenceswhen they are endogenouswith respect to group
ehavior. In this last case, incentives are able to convey relevant
nformation about other people’s behavior and intentions.16
Our second purpose is to analyze whether there is any differ-
nce in average contributions between the treatment with high
bligation and no incentives (H(no-i)) and the treatment with high
bligation and a very low level of non-binding incentives (H(low-
)). Graphical evidence in Fig. 1 shows that average unconditional
ontributions are different (11.3 and 14.8 tokens in H(no-i) and
(low-i) respectively: 30% higher in the presence of incentives). A
ann–Whitney rank-sum test and a t-test (see Table 2) corrobo-
ate thehypothesis of a signiﬁcant difference in contributions to the
ublic good between the two treatments. This means that, in the
resence of an obligation of minimum contributions, even a very
mall incentive tending to 0 positively shapes cooperative behav-
or. By comparing the H(no-i) and the H treatment (equivalent to
(low-i) but with higher yet still weak incentives) the same results
old.
Finally, we evaluate the impact of a variation in the level of
ncentives in the presence of a minimum requested contribution to
he public good. To investigate this question we compare uncon-
itional contributions in treatment H, where the probability of the
onitoring parameter and the sanction/reward rate are ﬁxed at
=1/2andg=1.2 respectively, to contributions in treatmentH(low-
), where we set the expected sanction (reward) parameters as
ollows: p=1/100 and g=1.2. In this second case, the monitoring
robability is almost only 1/10 of its probability in treatment H
nd the per-unit reward (sanction) is 0.012 tokens (the monetary
quivalent is 1/3 of a eurocent). Graphical evidence in Fig. 1 shows
hat average unconditional contributions in the two treatments are
ery close to each other (15.1 and 14.8 in H and H(low-i) respec-
ively). The results of testes reported in Table 2, conﬁrm that we
annot reject the hypothesis that the average unconditional con-
ributions in the two high-obligation treatments are the same at
ny conventional level.
This evidence can be summarized as follows:
esult 2. The introduction of a non-binding incentive structure in
he absence of obligations does not affect contributions to the pub-
ic good. In the presence of aminimumrecommended contribution,
he introduction of non-binding incentives induces a signiﬁcant
ncrease in the provision of the public good. An increase in the level
f non-binding incentives in the presence of obligations does not
ffect average contributions.
Taken together, results 1 and 2 suggest that there is a posi-
ive interaction between non-binding incentives and obligations,
ffecting cooperative behavior. In the next section we further
xplore this hypothesis.
.3. Question 3: How do obligations and non-binding incentives
nteract with each other?
The results of the previous two sessions suggest the existence of
positive interaction between non-binding incentives and obliga-
ions, affecting contributions to the public good. In the presence of
high recommended minimum contribution, the introduction of
xtremely low incentives helps increase contributions. Moreover,
he effect of introducing an obligation is stronger in the pres-
nce of incentives than in their absence (the difference between
16 This evidence is consistent with the results of Tyran and Feld (2006) showing
hat exogenous mild sanctions do not anchor contributions in public good games,
hile endogenously voted mild sanctions affect contributions signiﬁcantly.PG 0 L H(low-i)H(no-i) H
Fig. 3. Beliefs about others’ unconditional contributions.
unconditional contributions in H and 0 treatments is higher than
the difference between PG and H(no-i)). We now further explore
this issue. We compare the differences between contributions in
the baseline PG treatment and the treatmentwith obligationswith-
out incentives (H(no-i)), to the difference in contributions between
PG, H(low-i) and H, where incentives and obligations are both
present. We observe that while the simple introduction of an obli-
gation increases contributions by about 40% (H(no-i) vs. PG), the
introduction of an obligation jointly supported by non-binding
incentives increases contributions bymore than80% (contributions
in H(low-i) and H are respectively 84% and 87% higher than in PG).
This means that the effects of obligations on cooperative behav-
ior are much stronger when they are supported by incentives. This
result is particularly important as it shows a major alternative role
of incentives. Incentives are crucial not only when they can enforce
rules by changing people’s dominant strategies. From our analy-
sis, a complementary relation between obligations and incentives
emerges: obligations are more effective when an incentive is pro-
vided, even if this incentive is non-binding with respect to the
individuals’ payoffs.
Result3. Obligationsandnon-binding incentives are complemen-
tary in supporting cooperation in public good games.
The next step in our analysis is to provide some evidence on
howobligations and non-binding incentiveswork in shaping coop-
erative behavior. Since material payoffs are not affected, other
behavioral channels must come into play: we investigate expec-
tations about others’ contributions and social preferences.
4.4. Question 4: Channels through which obligations and
non-binding incentives affect behavior
4.4.1. Beliefs
Our next step is to study how obligations and non-binding
incentives affect beliefs about others’ contributions. Fig. 3 shows
the average beliefs in all treatments about the average uncondi-
tional contributions in the group.
This evidence can be summarized as follows. First, beliefs about
others’ average contributions are coordinated toward higher levels
of expected cooperation, when the minimum level of contribution
required by an obligation is higher. Second, non-binding incen-
tives tend to affect individuals’ beliefs. Indeed, ﬁrst order beliefs
in the treatment H(low-i) tend to be higher than in the treatment
H(no-i) (see Fig. 3; Mann Whitney test implies a: z-stat =−2.250; t-
stat =−2.368). Third, obligations and non-binding incentives have
a complementary effect on individuals’ expectations about others’
behavior. In fact,whenbothobligations andnon-binding incentives
are present ﬁrst order beliefs tend to be higher.
In sum, the results on cooperative behavior seem to be valid
for our expectations about cooperative behavior. This suggests
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Fig. 4. Conditional
hat the effect of obligations and non-binding incentives on coop-
ration may be partially triggered by beliefs about conditional
o-operators, i.e. people who want to cooperate if they expect oth-
rs to contribute to a sufﬁcient extent. Result 4 summarizes the
vidence on beliefs.
esult 4. Obligations and non-binding incentives affect beliefs
bout others’ unconditional contributions.
.4.2. Analysis of conditional contributions
Wenowanalyze the patterns of conditional contributions under
ifferent conditions. The idea here is that conditional contribution
chedules capture the full range of individual strategies to con-
rol for beliefs about others’ contributions by means of the strategy
ethod (Fischbacher et al., 2001). Signiﬁcant differences in condi-
ional contribution schedules across treatmentswould suggest that
bligations and non-binding incentives may affect contributions
hrough an effect on motives for behavior other than beliefs about
thers’ contributions.
Fig. 4 reports the patterns of conditional contributions under
he six different treatments. The curves corresponding to the ‘H
ondition’ and the ‘0 condition’ differ noticeably over the entire
nterval between 0 and 20. In particular, the conditional contribu-
ion schedule corresponding to the ‘H condition’ is clearly above
he one corresponding to the ‘0 condition’. The ‘L condition’ curve
iffers from the other two curves: with respect to the ‘0 condi-
ion’ curve the difference is particularly marked in correspondence
ith high levels of other people’s hypothetical average contrib-
tions, whereas with respect to the ‘H condition’ the difference
s more relevant for low levels of others’ hypothetical average
ontributions. The differences among the conditional contribution
chedules highlight the fact that, even ifwe control for beliefs about
thers’ contributions by means of the strategy method, average
ooperation turns out to be triggered by the level of minimum
ontribution required by the obligation.
Moreover, where the obligation is not sustained by an incentive,
e notice that the conditional contribution schedule in treatment
(no-i) is only slightly higher than in the baseline public good
ame. Nonetheless, by adding a non-binding incentive structure,
e observe a great difference between conditional contributiontribution in the group
ibution schedules.
schedules in the presence and in the absence of an obligation.
Finally, we ﬁnd a relevant difference between schedules in the
H(no-i) and H(low-i) cases, suggesting that, in the presence of an
obligation, the existence of an incentive, even if non-binding and
very small, hasadirect effecton individualwillingness to cooperate,
once we control for beliefs.
To summarize this analysis, our main result is the following:
Result 5. In the presence of higher obligations coupled with
non-binding incentives, we observe an upward shift in conditional
contributions.
This ﬁnding can be interpreted as an indication of the fact
that some people have a preference for complying with norms
(Lopez-Perez, 2008). Under this view, the introduction of obliga-
tions anchors individual preferences for norm compliance.
5. Comments and concluding remarks
Understanding how formal rules affect human behavior is a
fundamental task for economic theory and for policy makers. The
economics literature has studied extensively the role of incentives
in shaping people’s choices. Incentives can modify the payoffs for
individuals’ actions, thus inducing the desired behaviors. Nonethe-
less, formal rules are often backed by weak incentives. Deviations
from behaviors recommended by formal rules are characterized
either by low probabilities of monitoring, or small sanctions for
undesired behaviors. Despite such a widespread presence of weak
incentives, people often abide by the rules.
Explaining why people comply with rules in the presence of
weak incentives is a major puzzle in economics. Other disciplines,
such as legal theory and social psychology, suggest that obligations,
that is to say the normative contents of rules, play a crucial role in
driving individuals’ behavior. Yet, we still know very little about
how obligations affect behavior, and how they interact with the
incentives part of a rule. In this paper, by running a series of mod-
iﬁed public good games, we have contributed to clarifying these
issues, thus providing a more complete view of how formal rules
work.
We have found that obligations have a sizeable effect on
cooperative behavior, even in the absence of incentives. When
Table A1
Paired lottery choices.
Option A Option B Payoff differences (A-B)
1/10 100 tokens; 9/10 80 tokens 1/10 170 tokens; 9/10 10 tokens 56
3/10 100 tokens; 7/10 80 tokens 3/10 170 tokens; 7/10 10 tokens 28
5/10 100 tokens; 5/10 80 tokens 5/10 170 tokens; 5/10 10 tokens 0
7/10 100 tokens; 3/10 80 tokens 7/10 170 tokens; 3/10 10 tokens −28
0 10 tokens −56
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Table A2
Risk preferences associated to lottery choices.
Sequence of choices Risk type
A-A-A-A-A Highly risk averse
A-A-A-A-B Risk averse
A-A-A-B-B or A-A-B-B-B Risk neutral
A-B-B-B-B Risk lover
B-B-B-B-B Highly risk lover
Other sequences Inconsistent choices
Table A3
Frequencies of subjects by class of risk preferences.
Class of risk
preferences
0 condition
(MC=0)
L condition
(MC=4)
H condition
(MC=16)
Highly risk
averse
6 1 2
Risk averse 5 3 6
Risk neutral 14 23 16
Risk lover 1 2 0
Highly risk
lover
1 1 1
risk-neutral individuals, the second is composed of risk-adverse
individuals and the third one of highly risk-averse individuals.17
Moreover, for each subject we compute an index given by the9/10 100 tokens; 1/10 80 tokens 9/10 170 tokens; 1/1
on-binding incentives are introduced, requested contributions
trongly sustain cooperation. Our results suggest that, in public
ood situations, obligations and non-binding incentives are com-
lementary, jointly supporting high levels of contributions. Since
n our framework the incentive structure does not modify material
ayoffs, this means that, combined with an obligation, incentives
rowd-in reasons for behavior other than self-interest in sustaining
ooperation. One potential criticismof this interpretation relates to
he Prospect Theory. Despite incentives never being binding in our
reatments, when we introduce incentives in the absence of obli-
ations, they only take the form of rewards (i.e. the presence of an
ncentive does not involve the danger of a loss). However, if incen-
ives are introduced in the presence of obligations, then they come
n the form of both rewards and punishments, so that the dan-
er of a loss is introduced. Thus, in principle, incentives may affect
ehavior not only by reinforcing the salience of norms, but also by
ntroducing the possibility of losses. However, the H(Low-i) treat-
ent shows that evenveryweak incentives (adetectionprobability
f 1/100) reinforce the impact of obligations on contributionbehav-
or. In this case, the explanation related to loss aversion is not very
ikely: where punishment is so improbable, it is not really plausible
hat the behavioral changes are caused by the fear of loss.
Furthermore, through a strategy based on the elicitation of
eliefs and conditional contributions to the public good, we have
ound that the effect of obligations on behavior depends not only
n their impact on people’s beliefs about others’ contributions, but
lso on their direct effect on individual willingness to cooperate.
These results add to the literature on the effects of institu-
ions on behavior in two ways. First, they support the idea that
ormal rules and laws have an expressive power: they can affect
ehavior not only by shaping material payoffs for individuals, but
lso by directly inﬂuencing people’s motives for behavior (Cooter,
000) and by acting as focal points (McAdams, 2000). Second,
hey suggest some important behavioral effects of incentives. Our
xperimental results show that incentives may affect cooperative
ehavior not only by changing payoffs, but also by complementing
bligations.
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Appendix 1. Controlling for differences in risk preferences
In order to control for the possible effect of risk preferences, at
the end of the public good experimentwe run a lottery to single out
the subjects’ risk preferences. This lottery is similar to that imple-
mented by Holt and Laury (2001). The experimental test is based
on ﬁve choices between the paired lotteries reported in Table A1.
In each paired lottery, subjects choose between an alternative A
and an alternative B. Once all the subjects have made their choice,
a pair of lotteries is randomly chosen and the computer assigns to
each subject the option (Aor B) theyhave chosen. Finally the lottery
is run in order to determine each subject’s payoff. Following the
method proposed by Holt and Laury (2001), we classify individual
risk preferences according to the sequence of choices taken in the
lottery (see Table A2).
In Table A3 we report the frequencies of subjects by classes
of risk preference in the three treatments with different levels of
obligation.
It is worth noting that the frequencies are similar across the
different samples. Furthermore, we notice that the number of risk-
lover or highly risk-lover individuals is very small.
In order to test whether or not differences in risk preferences
are relevant in explaining differences in contributions, we subdi-
vide our sample into three groups: the ﬁrst group is composed of17 We have not considered risk-lover or highly risk-lover individuals, who repre-
sent a negligible fraction of subjects in the sample, nor individuals whose choices
are inconsistent.
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Cifference between their unconditional contribution and the min-
mum contribution required in the treatment. We then apply a
ann–Whitney rank-sum test18 of the difference in this index
etween each pair of groups. The test between risk neutral and
ighly risk-averse individuals yields z=−1.295, which is not statis-
ically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Applied to the difference
n this index between risk-neutral and risk-averse individuals, the
ame test yields z=−0.627, which is certainly not statistically sig-
iﬁcant. Finally, the difference between highly risk-averse and
isk-averse individuals is also found to not be statistically signif-
cant (z=−0.539).
Hence, differences in subjects’ risk preferences across the dif-
erent samples do not affect our results for two reasons. First, the
istribution of subjects by class of risk preference is very similar in
he different sessions. Second, there is no signiﬁcant difference in
ndividual behaviors, with respect to the minimum contribution,
etween highly risk-averse, risk-averse and risk-neutral individ-
als. This last result can be explainedby the fact that the probability
f being audited in each round and the penalty rate are both very
ow.
ppendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
he online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2014.03.001.
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